What happens if both bidders are predatory and attempt to push rival payments up toward the …nal clock prices? As we saw in Section III of the paper, a bidder can relax its …nal bid constraint and increase its rival's cost by exaggerating demand in the clock phase before dropping demand to clear the market. It is di¢ cult to develop an equilibrium theory if both bidders employ non-proxy strategies, so in this section we take a more direct approach. We assume bidders maximize their own payo¤s and focus on proxy clock phase strategies, but also assume that each bidder is able to relax the revealed preference constraint on its …nal bids, forcing its rival to pay closer to the …nal clock price for all units. This modeling approach is motivated by the features of CCA sales with multiple categories. Under the multi-category CCA rules that have been used in practice, bidders do in fact have a fair amount of ‡exibility to relax the …nal round revealed preference constraints without greatly distorting their clock phase bidding.
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Speci…cally, we focus on strategies in which bidder i uses a (linear) demand v i (x) = A i B i x in the clock phase, with A i B i > 0, and then in the …nal round submits demand
that is a linear combination of the clock demand v i (x) and the …nal clock price p .
The parameter i 2 [0; 1] captures the extent to which bidder i is able to relax the local revealed preference constraints. If i = 0, bidder i is consistent. If i > 0, bidder i is able to increase her stated values in the …nal bid toward the …nal clock price. In particular, because v i (x) is decreasing from p above x i , an increase in i means that bidder i's …nal bid function is everywhere steeper, starting from the same bid for x i . So an increase in i increases the rival's total payment and marginal prices.
The behavior of the predatory bidder 2 in Section III is also captured in this model, by assuming that 2 = 1. Indeed, the equilibrium described there will correspond to the one we will identify below, with 1 = 0 and 2 = 1.
A complete strategy for bidder i is described by (A i ; B i ; i ): As we did in Section II, we treat 1 ; 2 as parameters, and solve for an ex post equilibrium in choices of (A i ; B i ). As in the above analysis, these equilibria will have the feature that A i varies with a i but B i does not.
A.1 Proxy Best Responses
We identify a strategy for bidder 1 that is an ex post best response, assuming that bidder 2 follows a linear proxy strategy v 2 with varying intercept, and …nal round strategy given by 2 .
Suppose bidder 1 uses the proxy demand v 1 (x). He will win x 1 units, where x 1 satis…es:
The ending clock price will be p = v 2 (1 x 1 ). So bidder 2's …nal bid will specify:
The …nal payment by bidder 1 will be
Bidder 1's marginal payment for his x 1 th unit is v 2 (1 x 1 ) + 2 B 2 x 1 : Therefore a necessary condition for bidder 1's behavior to be ex post optimal is that his marginal value for his last unit is just equal to his marginal payment for that unit:
Substituting the market-clearing condition (2) we get that the optimality condition (5) will hold for all v 2 and corresponding purchase quantities x 1 provided that:
A subtle issue here is that not only can v 1 or v 2 take negative values, but bidder i's best response may involve ending the auction at a negative clock price. For now, we allow this possibility, and return to it later. With this allowance, bidder 1 has an ex post best response that involves a linear proxy strategy for the clock phase with A 1 = a 1 and
A.2 Proxy Equilibria
We now solve for an ex post equilibrium in linear proxy strategies. Since we already found that i's best-response has A i = a i ; we need only to solve for the equilibrium B i : Using the best response
De…ning
allows us to describe the ex post equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 3. If bidders relax the local revealed preference constraints in the …nal bid round, so that they bid s i (x) = (1 i ) v i (x) + i p in the …nal round, where p is the …nal clock phase price, then for any 1 ; 2 with 1 2 < 1, there is an ex post equilibrium of the CCA in which each bidder i uses a linear proxy strategy
As noted above, our analysis allows for a negative market clearing price in the clock phase. This 
A.3 Properties of the Equilibria
Bidding Behavior. In the mutually aggressive equilibrium, demand in the clock phase is lower than under truthful bidding:
This contrasts with the model in Section II, where the equilibrium response in the clock phase to bidders being quiet in their …nal bids was demand expansion.
Allocation and Revenue. Again, the equilibrium allocation and revenue generally di¤er from the truthful Vickrey outcomes. Consider the symmetric example (the extreme asymmetric case 1 = 0 and 2 = 1 is outcome-equivalent to the predatory player model discussed in Section III). That is, suppose 1 = 2 = and b 1 = b 2 = b; which implies 1 = 2 = 1 b: Then the allocation is distorted toward 1/2 compared to the e¢ cient allocation x e 1 :
Under our maintained assumption ja 1 a 2 j < b, the revenue is decreasing in (so despite the more aggressive …nal round bidding when > 0, revenues are lower than under truthful bidding since the demand reduction e¤ect dominates).
B. Omitted Calculations from Section II
In Section II, we solve for a range of ex post equilibria of the CCA in proxy strategies. We then consider the resulting allocation and revenue for symmetric equilibria. Here we …ll in some omitted calculations.
B.1 Symmetric Equilibria
In this case, 1 = 2 = and b 1 = b 2 = b. Bidder i's equilibrium clock round strategy is
Bidder i's equilibrium …nal bid strategy is
so that
The equilibrium bid parameters are
The equilibrium outcome x solves v 1 (x) = v 2 (1 x), which means
Here we omit the 1 subscript to slightly simplify notation.
To solve for revenue, we consider three cases.
CASE 1: Suppose the parameters are such that s 1 (1) ; s 2 (1) 0, which is equivalent to a i b 1
:
Then the CCA revenue, given a …nal allocation (x ; 1 x ) is
Substituting for A 1 ; A 2 , B, and x we get:
Simplifying
which leads to the expression
It follows that
where the last inequality follows because b > ja 1 a 2 j by assumption, and 1. Now, if = 0 so that both bidders are consistent, the equilibrium outcome of the CCA is exactly the same as a truthful Vickrey auction. If > 0, the revenue is lower. So the equilibrium CCA revenue is less than the truthful Vickrey revenue.
CASE 2: Suppose the parameters are such that s 1 (1) ; s 2 (1) < 0; which is equivalent to a i < b 1
In that case the revenue is
we can write the revenue as
If 2 + 1 0; this is unambiguously negative. Otherwise, recall that we assumed b > ja 1 a 2 j and a i b:
which is positive for all 2 [0; 1] : Hence, also in this case revenues decline in : : In that case the revenue is
We claim that it is negative. To prove it, we need to show that
Note that since in our case a 2 > a 1 ; the term 2a 1 (a 2 b) + a 2 1 a 2 2 decreases in a 2 and increases in a 1 so that it is minimized at a 2 = b + a 1 and a 1 = b (recall the assumptions ja 2 a 1 j < b and
Hence,
If + 2 1 0, the expression is positive. Otherwise, it is minimized when (a 1 a 2 ) 2 is maximized. Using again ja 2 a 1 j < b we can bound the whole expression from below by In summary, revenue in all three cases decreases in : Since revenue is continuous on the boundaries of the three cases, the overall claim is established.
B.2 Asymmetric Equilibria.
Suppose now 1 > 0 and 2 = 0. In equilibrium, bidder 1 is truthful in the clock phase:
v 1 (x) = u 1 (x) = a 1 b 1 x but does not fully raise his …nal bids, so that s 1 (x) = a 1 (1 + 1 ) b 1 x Bidder 2 expands demand to
in the clock phase, where 2 = 1 b 1 , and then is consistent in the …nal round, so that: This expression can be either positive or negative, depending on the parameters that determine x .
The intuition is the following. As 1 increases, bidder 1 gives bidder 2 a discount, while bidder 2 (by expanding demand) makes bidder 1 pay more. The allocation also changes but that has a second-order e¤ect on revenue. The net e¤ect is that revenue increases if x 1 is su¢ ciently high, and otherwise decreases.
